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The anarchic polyarchy of world politics is based 
primarily on a system of territorial political communi­
ties. This is no historical novelty. Such systems 
existed in the past, in early Mesopotamia, in China, 
Greece, late Mediaeval and Renaissance Italy, then 
Europe. Students of international politics have stud­
ied some of these systems for comparative purposes 
in order to try to understand our own.1 However, 
our system differs from these earlier systems in sev­
eral important aspects. First, it is global; second, 
its major components are three-dimensionally per­
meable at all times; and, third, it is physically de­
structible. Let us examine each of these features 
separately in greater detail.
a. globality2
At various historical epochs, prior to the twentieth 
century, multistate systems that varied greatly in 
territorial extent developed in contiguous or non­
contiguous regions of our globe, and certain empires 
with pretensions of universality were built. Yet 
neither these empires, nor these multistate systems 
ever encompassed the entire globe.
Today, however, even though mankind remains 
divided into many different peoples and states, a 
single multistate system exists for the first time in 
the history of spaceship earth. This system, a crazy- 
quilt on any multicolored political map of the world, 
spreads out over a closed field, the boundaries of 
which are those of the great globe itself.
The historical or macropolitical process toward 
globalization or universality is believed to have begun 
with an era of Middle East dominance that lasted from 
the dawn of human civilization in Mesopotamia until 
about 500 B.C. During the era of the Eurasian cultur­
al balance that followed, the Roman Empire emerged 
in the West and the Han (Chinese) Empire emerged 
in the Far East, with the Parthian and Kushan em­
pires in between. Africa and America were peripher­
al, «fringe» civilizations of this Eurasian ecumene 
(inhabited world) which arose between 500 B.C.
1. K.J. Holsti, International Politics, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 27-59. W. Franks, «The Ita­
lian City-States as an International System», in M. A. Kaplan, 
ed., New Approaches to International Relations, New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1968, pp. 426-458. P.J. Fliess, Thucydides 
and Politics of Bipolarity, Baton Rouge: University of Loui­
siana Press, 1966. The universe of international systems, 
past, present, future, and hypothetical, is said to be the prop­
er object of the study of international relations. G. Modelski, 
«Agraria and Industria, Two Models of International Sys­
tems», in K. Knorr and S. Verba, The International System, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 121.
2. The summary that follows is based on W.H. McNeill, 
The Rise of the West, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963, pp. IX-XII. (Table of Contents), 249-253, 565-567.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 02:59:38 |
the three outstanding features of the global system
and 200 A.D. After several fluctuations in this ecu­
mene which witnessed the Western Roman Empire’s 
downfall in the fifth century A.D. and a revival of 
Middle Eastern culture and political power with 
Islam’s rise in the seventh century A.D., a third 
era opened. It covered the centuries from about 1500 
to our own. Up to about 1917, this was the era of 
Western European dominance. It featured the «clo­
sure» of the ecumene since about 1900, with no fringe 
areas left outside it.
The global political implications of this novel fea­
ture in mankind’s history are twofold:
First, the closure of the ecumene means that out­
side the contemporary multistate system no new 
territories, no terrae nullius in legal terms, exist 
any longer on our globe for discovery, exploration, 
and conquest. For the major European states this 
meant that no territories were left outside of Europe 
for emigration, colonization, and expansion. For the 
United States and Russia, this was the end of their 
expansion westward and eastward, respectively, 
on the north American continent and Eurasia. Any 
territorial expansion of one of the system’s political 
units would have to be at the expense of another unit 
of the system. It might lead to intrasystemic war. 
This partly accounts for the facts that economic and 
social development and, in certain cases, economic, 
political and social integration of several adjacent 
states, have become major internal and external goals 
of states in our era, rather than territorial expansion; 
that means other than territorial control are devised 
by some states in efforts to expand their political 
influence on other states; that territorial sovereignty 
has expanded downward, under the oceans, to the 
continental shelf, and that the extent of traditional 
res communes such as the open seas has been reduced 
even as new res communes are created in Antarctica 
and outer space.
Second, the closure of the ecumene brought about 
the disappearance of any political environment of 
the multistate system. As a result, no outside bar­
barians, the «external proletariat» in Toynbee’s terms, 
exist any longer, to take over the system, as happened 
with the Roman empire. Violent changes can be 
brought about only from within the system, by the 
«internal proletariat». Wars tend toward civil strife, 
just as civil strife tends to be, or to become, an inter­
national war of sorts. In different terms, the border 
line between the civic and the military arenas has 
become blurred.1
Moreover, no possibility exists for a peripheral 
state to take over the multistate system and fuse its
1. H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society,New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 252, make this 
distinction. They defined a military arena as one where the 
expectation of violence is low.
component political units into a single empire, as 
Babylon had done with the warring Mesopotamian 
temple states; Macedonia with the system of ancient 
Greek city-states; the Ch’in, with the warring states 
in ancient China; and Rome with the Hellenistic 
kingdoms in the eastern Mediterranean.
If a universal empire or world government is to be 
set up, it must be either by voluntary amalgamation 
of existing political units within the multistate system 
or by universal conquest by one of the political units 
within that system or a group of them, or by a world­
wide revolution. In our closed global system, it is 
not surprising that the United States and the USSR, 
with their respective nuclear capabilities appeared 
to the eminent nuclear physicist, Robert Oppenheimer, 
as two scorpions inside a bottle (emphasis added). 
Would American and Soviet efforts to explore outer 
space be due to claustrophobic efforts of these two 
deadly scorpions to escape from their closed bottle? 
No one can tell. Outer space, according to one scien­
tist, represents a new frontier.2
That Western Europeans, not Chinese, Indians, 
Incas, or Ewes, achieved the closure of the ecumene 
thanks to their technical superiority in transport and 
communications which enabled them to control the 
oceans and extend the range of their military force 
to other continents, has had other far-reaching con­
sequences for world politics.
First, the new political units set up in the former 
European colonies followed the European model of 
the territorial state as this developed after the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648). As a glance at any collection of 
constitutions will show, all these new states have such 
organic laws. Like the pioneering US Constitu­
tion, these written documents establish a framework 
of government that directly or indirectly is of Western 
European provenance. At the same time, utopias 
and ideologies born in Western Europe together with 
the industrial revolution, such as socialism in various 
forms, have spread throughout the world, even in the 
absence of industrialization.
Second, the Law of Nations, which until the Paris 
Peace Treaty of 1856 had been applied only to the 
Christian nations of Europe, has tended to become 
the common universal law of nations.3
Third, political structures that originated in Eu­
ropean international politics, such as international 
organizations, have become a feature of the entire 
global multistate system, as witness the United Na­
tions, with its universality of membership.
Fourth, anti-European, perhaps anti-White racial
2. F. Dyson, «Human Consequences of the Exploration 
of Space», Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. XXV, no. 7, 
September 1968, 8-13.
3. W. Jenks, The Common Universality of the International 
Law of Mankind, New York: Praeger, 1958.
75
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attitudes have developed among the non-European 
people of the new states—with various effects on the 
texture of global politics. Thus, at the Bandung 
Conference (April 18-24, 1955), which was the first 
international gathering limited to 29 Asian and 
African states representing 1.4 billion people (Com­
munist China included but not the USSR, which is 
partly Asiatic, not Nationalist China or Israel), 
most representatives expressed grievances against 
the West and its colonialist record; expressed fear 
of a possible resurgence of Western imperialism; 
blamed the West for their underdevelopment; and 
felt that aid from the West, the United States in­
cluded, was a matter of justice and right, even a 
sort of compensation due to them for previously 
practiced colonial exploitation by people of Euro­
pean stock.1
Fifth, people in these new, non-European states 
have questioned the suitability of European insti­
tutions, and, occasionally, the appropriateness of 
existing international law and international organi­
zation for the conduct of their international relations. 
Some of their leaders have clamored for a new inter­
national law that would presumably be a synthesis 
of their own conceptions of this law and of the tra­
ditional European conceptions. Indonesia, under 
Sukarno, withdrew for a while from membership 
in the United Nations and sought to set up a new in­
ternational organization for Southeast Asia, perhaps 
together with Communist China.
Finally, because of the contribution of Europeans 
to the closure of the ecumene, it was they who first 
viewed the physical world as it actually was and in 
terms of political geography, geopolitics, and world 
politics.
b. three-dimensional permeability
The author of a book published in 1959 maintained 
that the political components of the multistate system 
that emerged in Europe slightly over three centuries 
ago had been impermeable, «hard-shell units», be­
cause of the then prevailing technology of warfare. 
Hence, the principle of territorial sovereignty adopt­
ed at the time by European sovereigns as the basis 
of their mutual relations coincided, supposedly, with 
their capability of defending their territory. By 
contrast, the component units of our own multistate 
system had become permeable, because of revolu­
tionary developments in peace and war technology. 
It followed that since the concept of territorial so­
vereignty no longer reflected impermeability, it was
1. I. W. Meister, «The Bandung Conference: An Apprais­
al», in R. Strauss-Hupe and H.W. Hazard, eds., The Idea
of Colonialism, New York: Praeger, 1958, p. 236.
obsolete. With it so was the «hard-shell power unit», 
the territorial state, which therefore was destined to 
wither away, together with the multistate system.2
More than a decade has passed since this predic­
tion was made. Yet far from withering away, the units 
of our multistate system have been thriving. Since 
1959, forty-eight new states were added to the sys­
tem. The membership of the United Nations rose 
from 51 in 1946 to 132 in 1971. In 1968 the book’s 
author himself was obliged to acknowledge that his 
prognosis had been incorrect.3
The fa :t is that both territoriality and permeability 
have been basic features of all political communities 
since the dawn of civilization. Students of animal 
behavior observe that territoriality is also a feature 
of certain animal societies. They define territory as 
the area of space, whether of water, earth, or air, 
that an animal will guard as its exclusive possession 
and defend against all members of its kind.4
As for permeability, it is a necessary condition 
for interpolity relations in a multistate system. It 
always has been a feature of polities in such a sys­
tem, not only in wartime when soldiers of one polity 
penetrate the territory of another, but also in times 
of peaceful symbiosis among governments and peo­
ples of different polities in that system. Permeability 
has been evident not only in the migrations of peoples 
from one part of the world to another but also in 
the extraordinarily free travel of tradesmen, crafts­
men, artists, and thinkers in the «worlds» of China 
of the «Warring States», of ancient Hellas, of Me­
diaeval Europe, of the Renaissance and of the «En­
lightenment».
If territoriality is, as some writers maintain, ul­
timately rooted in animal behavior, the permeability 
of human communities would have to be a cultural, 
not a biological phenomenon. Civilized man, in 
contrast to brown rats, has learned to tolerate under 
certain circumstances the intruder from another 
polity, the diplomat, the trader, the traveler, despite 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia, nationalism. The pre­
sence of an intruder in a polity does not automati-
2. J.H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 42.
3. J.H. Herz, «The Territorial State Revisited: Reflec­
tions on the Future of the Nation-State», Polity, voi. 1, no. 
1, 1968, pp. 12-34.
4. R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative, New York: 
Atheneum Press, 1966, p. 3. He considers territoriality a key 
factor in any animal behavior. His ethnologist critics reject 
this single-factor approach but emphasize that territorial 
behaviour is not an intrinsic aspect of an individual’s motiva­
tion, but constitutes a «group characteristic» that stems from 
the cohabitation of a group of individuals in a particular lo­
cality and from their interaction. J.H. Crook, «The Nature 
of Territorial Aggression», in M.F. Ashley Montagu, ed., 
Man and Agression, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1968, p. 48.
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cally arouse intraspecific aggression, in peacetime at 
least, as it does among rats.1
The principles of cujus regio ejus religio—that 
the ruling prince in each state has the right to set up 
his religion as the exclusive faith2—as well as of 
territorial sovereignty and exclusive territorial juris­
diction, of inviolability and nonintervention that 
European sovereigns after the Peace of Westphalia 
adopted as norms that should govern their mutual 
relations emerged exactly at a time when the per­
meability of the units of the European multistate 
system had greatly increased. For the firearms and 
artillery, which had enabled kings to destroy the 
mediaeval moats and walls of feudal castles and create 
empire-sized territorial units administered in a cen­
tralized way, had also increased the vulnerability 
of these larger territorial units and threatened their 
security. And the widespread transpolity circulation 
of printed tracts and books, such as the Vindiciae 
contra tyrannos or the pamphlets advocating regi­
cide to Protestant or Roman Catholics in these emerg­
ing polities,3 endangered the lives of the sovereigns 
themselves, if not the very foundations of their rule. 
Thus, these principles were not legal expressions of 
some actual physical impermeability of the emerging 
European states, which, despite efforts of military 
engineers as De Vauban (1633-1707) in France,4 
were hardly «hard-shell power units», as the wars 
of Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, Charles XII of 
Sweden, or Napoleon demonstrated. They were poli- 
ticojuridical, cultural replacements of the walls and 
castles rendered obsolete by gunpowder-propelled 
cannonballs. Their purpose was to establish a legal 
fiction of impermeability for each state, to regulate 
the increased peacetime permeability symbolized by 
institutionalized resident diplomacy, and to mitigate, 
through rules of warfare, the potentially harmful 
effects of wartime permeability.
The concept of the «balance of power» represented 
another aspect of the concerted effort of the major 
European states to ensure their continued existence,
1. K. Lorenz, On Agression, New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World 1963, p. 161.
2. The European princes agreed on this in the religious 
peace of Augsburg of 1555. Under this treaty, the Lutheran 
princes secured full equality with the Roman Catholic princes, 
including the right to determine within their respective ter­
ritories, the religion of the inhabitants. A. Nussbaum, A 
Concise History of the Law of Nations, rev. ed., New York: 
Macmillan, 1954, p. 61.
3. George Buchanan was Protestant, Francisco Vitoria 
and Francisco Suarez, Roman Catholics, and all advocated 
regicide.
4. In 1914, the German armies sweeping through Belgium, 
demolished with enormously heavy artillery the great Belgian 
fortress of Liège and Namur, D. C. Watt, F. Spencer, and
N. Brown, A History of the World in the Twentieth Century, 
New York: William Morrow, 1968, pp. 217-219.
despite their increased vulnerability and permeability. 
Until World War I, international jurists regarded it 
either as a fundamental legal principle or legal right 
in international law derived from the right of self- 
preservation, or as a political condition of internation­
al law.
What has happened to the permeability of states 
in our times is that it has acquired altogether and 
unprecedented a character—a third dimension— 
because of revolutionary developments in transport 
and communications. Since Kitty Hawk in 1911, it 
has become possible to overfly the territory of other 
states, with implications for warfare first realized 
on Christmas eve 1914, when a single German plane 
dropped a single bomb on London. Governments 
today are able to apply massive violence on the foe’s 
noncombatant population, which in the past was either 
out of reach because it lay behind the military front or 
because rules of ground warfare exempted it from vio­
lence that could be followed. And since the early twen­
tieth century again, governments and other organi­
zations of one state are able to communicate to 
people of another state both in peacetime and war­
time in order to manipulate their attitudes through 
information, propaganda, and psychological war­
fare, without any physical intrusion into the air 
space of the other state, except through wireless wa­
ves. In the near future, indeed, they will be able to do 
so by means of television. And since the sixth decade 
of our century, governments are able to engage in 
surveillance operations unprecedented in history 
thanks to unmanned artificial satellites orbiting the 
earth or suspended in outer space, without any vio­
lation of the air space of other states.
The response of governments to such develop­
ments consisted in intense efforts to regulate their 
peacetime permeability by international agreements 
that would enable them to maintain their separate 
identity as units of the multistate system. Thus, in 
the Paris Convention of 1919 for regulating aerial 
navigation they agreed that their sovereignty extend­
ed to the air space above each state’s territory and 
territorial waters.5 In the multipartite treaty of the 
UN Charter they reaffirmed their respect for each 
other’s sovereignty, and through the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1945, they 
sought to regulate the flight of civilian aircraft over 
their territory. And since 1957, they have been en­
gaged in trying to establish the limits between air 
space and outer space, tacitly recognizing that the 
law of air space does not necessarily extend to outer 
space.
These efforts of governments to maintain their
5. H. Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim's International Law, 
New York: David Mackay, voi. 1, 8th ed., 1955, p. 519.
77
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political autonomy in decision-making over persons, 
things, and events in a particular piece of territory, 
have led to the proliferation of tacit and explicit in­
ternational agreements, to the remarkable growth in 
the number of international organizations of general 
or limited competence,1 to the endeavors to produce 
a new body of international law. And the subject 
matter dealt with in international agreements, inter­
national organizations, and international law, has 
enormously expanded. A glance at the UN Charter 
and at the activities of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies confirms these points.
It remains to be seen whether these collective 
efforts to regulate state permeability portend the end 
of the extraordinarily free travel of traders, artists 
and thinkers that featured in earlier multistate sys­
tems well up to the beginning of our century. In 
our times, not only trade but cultural activities and 
sports have come within the ambit of international 
politics. If present trends continue, tourism (already 
rigidly controlled in communist party-states) may 
suffer the same fate. And the sphere of world politics 
may become coextensive with that of international 
relations.
c. destructibility
Destructibility became a distinctive feature of 
our multistate system since the first atomic bomb was 
detonated atop a steel tower at Alamogordo, in the 
New Mexican desert on July 16, 1955. This event, 
which was the outcome of man’s struggle not against 
nature but against man, is a vivid reminder of his 
capacity to change his milieu not as a healer but as 
a destroyer.
Especially since 1953, when the first hydrogen, 
fusion device was exploded at Eniwetok, man is cap­
able of achieving holocausts that used to be ascribed 
only to God’s will or to the unpredictable whims of 
Nature. With missiles of intercontinental range trav­
eling at supersonic speeds, he can deliver to any 
spot on our globe thermonuclear devices based on 
Einstein’s lethal equation about the conversion of 
mass into energy. A single such device produces ex­
plosive energy expressed in thousands or millions
1. During 1815-1967, the number of international organ­
izations surpassed the number of states in the multistate 
system around 1910 and rose thereafter at a discernibly 
faster pace. M. Wallace and J.D. Singer, «Intergovernmental
Organization in the Global System 1815-1967», International
Organization, vol. XXIV, no. 2, Spring 1970, 282-284. In 1968-
1969, 229 international political, economic, social or other 
intergovernmental associations of various kinds were in 
existence, the UN and its fifteen specialized agencies included. 
This represented an increase of 97 such organizations since 
1956-1957. Union of International Associations, Yearbook 
of International Organizations 1968-1969, Belgium, 1969, p. 15.
78
of tons of TNT (kilotons or megatons); generates 
quasisolar heat; emits lethal gamma rays; and is 
therefore capable of inflicting several millions of 
deaths. With the push of a button, man now can 
extinguish, in a single instantaneous blow, a whole 
people, a whole state, just as he has been able in the 
past, since Cain’s time, to kill one man with a single 
glow at the right spot of his skull. And, if he wished, 
he could even achieve his own doomsday, if not by 
blowing up our entire globe, at least by wiping out 
mankind from the face of the earth.
The production of the nuclear bomb was but an­
other manifestation of the technological revolution 
and specifically of the tremendous acceleration in 
man’s capacity to kill, as the following statistics indi­
cate:
Between 1,000,000 B.C. and about 1453 A.D. 
the maximum range of missiles (projectiles) rose 
only from the 0.01 miles of the hurled rock or club 
or spear, with a killing area of 0.003 square miles, 
to the maximum range of 0.35 miles of the catapult 
or ballista, with their killing area of 0.8 square 
miles.
Then, in the approximate five and a half centuries 
from 1453, when the Ottoman Turks battered with 
cannonballs the stout double walls of Constantinople 
and took the city, until 1912, i.e. two years before 
the outbreak of World War I, the maximum range 
of missiles rose from 1.0 miles with a killing area of 
3 square miles, to 11.4 miles, with a killing area of 
408 square miles.
Finally, in the brief period of forty-two years 
from 1912 to 1954, the maximum range of missiles 
and their killing area rose phenomenally from the 
aforementioned figures of 1912 to 12,500 miles and 
197,000,000 square miles, respectively—by means 
of the strategic air command plane armed with atomic 
bombs and refueled in flight.2 The time required 
for delivering interhemispherically weapons of mass 
destruction has shrunk from 20 hours for the 300- 
mile per hour B-29 to the 30-minute flight of the ICBM 
(Intercontinental Ballistic Missile).3
These data starkly underline the truth of the 
observation that, if in the political theory that deals 
with the state, the focus is on «the good life», spec­
ulation about global politics centers primarily on 
«the theory of survival».4 Survival, it should be 
noted, involves not merely the nation or the state,
2. H. Sprout and M. Sprout, Foundations of International 
Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1962, p. 253.
3. J.B. Wiesner and H.F. York, «National Security and 
the Nuclear-Test Ban», Scientific American, voi. 211, no. 4, 
October 1964, p. 27. With a fractional orbital bomb, the time 
is even shorter.
4. M. Wight, «Why is There No International Theory ?» 
in H. Butterfield, M. Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations, 
Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 33.
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as was occasionally the case in the prenuclear past, 
but perhaps each individual in the whole of mankind.
The implications of destructibility on global poli­
tics are:
First, in contrast to the situation in past multistate 
systems, no component political unit of the global 
system exists that is unconditionally viable, i.e., 
that cannot be physically destroyed as an independ­
ent source of political decisions. Conversely, all the 
system’s political units, without exception, are now 
only conditionally viable. The continued existence of 
all states, of the main subjects of international law, 
depends on the restraint of other states from exercis­
ing their capacity for destruction.1 The dominant 
nuclear superpowers can destroy not only the non­
nuclear and protonuclear states (Britain, France, 
China). They can also destroy each other.
Second, after World Wars I and II demonstrated 
a clear trend toward the globalization of warfare 
and its increasingly total character, because of man’s 
ability to penetrate from the air the belligerent com­
ponent units of the system and his tremendously 
expanded techniques of destruction, statesmen of the 
superpowers, despite their fierce antagonism, have 
avoided any direct violent confrontation that could 
lead to World War III. As a result, as soon as it 
became clear that the collective security system of the 
League of Nation’s successor could not effectively 
function, they set up collective self-defense organiza­
tions (NATO, OAS, Warsaw Pact, SEATO, CENTO). 
And, whenever war broke out in the multistate sys­
tem since 1945, they sought in various ways to keep 
hostilities limited both in geographic extent and in 
weaponry used. Moreover, they not only have engaged 
in ceaseless disarmament talk's since 1946, but have 
managed to conclude various nuclear arms control 
agreements, despite the mutual distrust, for ending 
the pollution of the atmosphere through radiation; 
for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to 
other states, or their emplacement in outer space and 
celestial bodies, such as the moon or on the seabed 
or ocean floor; and for averting the outbreak of a 
nuclear war because of an accident, misunderstand­
ing or miscalculation.2
1. K. Boulding, Conflict and Defense, New York: Harper 
Torchbooks 1962, pp. 58-59, develops the concept of viability. 
He defines it as the ability and willingness of parties to 
destroy each other. A party that can be absorbed or destroy­
ed by another, he writes, is conditionally viable, if the party 
that has the power to destroy it refrains from exercising this 
power. A party, on the other hand, that cannot be destroyed 
as an independent source of decisions is said to be uncondi­
tionally viable.
2. The following are the relevant treaties : the partial 
nuclear test ban of 1963; the «Hot Line» agreement, likewise
of 1963, with its supplementary agreements of 1972; the treaty 
of 1966 banning bombs in orbit, in outer space and on celes­
tial bodies; the agreement of 1967 on a nuclear-weapons-
All these instances of international behavior are 
signs of awareness of our multistate system’s de­
structibility among the decision-makers of the super­
powers and of the emergence of a consciousness of a 
community interest among them in taking steps to 
prevent the use of nuclear weapons or at least their 
unrestrained use among the society of states, and to 
lessen the chances of any outbreak of nuclear war 
through accident, misundestanding or miscalculation.
It is natural that the decision-makers, if they are 
motivated by a desire for self-preservation and not 
by a Freudian death wish, should become quite 
vividly aware of the need of cooperation in order 
to preserve the conditional viability of the units they 
govern. For, in contrast to weapons of the past, 
nuclear bombs discriminate neither between decision­
making élite and masses nor between capitalist and 
proletarian. That in the quarter-century that elapsed 
since Alamogordo, the leaders of the two nuclear 
superpowers should have managed to avoid any re­
sort to such weapons despite a number of quite grave 
confrontations, is thus no accident.3 Nor has it 
been fortuitous that the superpowers have acquiesced 
in UN preventive diplomacy; and that in 1956, at 
the Twentieth Party Congress, Nikita S. Khrush­
chev proclaimed that the Marxist-Leninist precept 
that as long as imperialism existed wars were inevi­
table, was no longer applicable.4
freeze zone in Latin America; the nonproliferation treaty of 
1968; the treaty of 1971 prohibiting the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on 
the seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil ; and the US- 
Soviet treaty of 1972 on Anti-Ballistic Missiles together with 
the interim agreement on offensive missiles.
3. Truman, in his memoirs, wants to be remembered 
primarily as a statesman who managed to avoid a third world 
war. Truman Memoirs, Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, 
1955, voi. 1. p. X.
4. F.S. Burin, «The Communist Doctrine About the 
Inevitability of War», American Political Science Review, 
vol. LVII, No. 2, 1963, 334-354, analysed this matter in detail. 
He concluded that the main revision made at this congress 
pertained to Lenin’s theory about the inevitability of wars 
between the capitalist states. Emphasis on the possibility of 
peaceful competitive coexistence between the «socialist» and 
«capitalist» camps, on the other hand, had already been made 
under Stalin at the CPSU’s Nineteenth Congress in 1952. 
This was a revision to communist views expressed at the 
Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 and an implicit rejection 
of Lenin’s tenet about the inevitability of war between the two 
camps at the CPSU’s Eighth Party Congress in 1919, which 
Western publicits ceaselessly underlined when wishing to 
emphasize the Soviet communist threat to peace. On the other 
hand, no responsible Soviet or American leader has consid­
ered world government to be the only alternative to annihi­
lation, as advocated by E.E. Harris, Annihilation and Utopia, 
New York: Humanities Press, 1966. In the view of Harold 
Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959, London, Mac­
millan, 1971, p. 297: «As the years have passed we seem to 
have learnt like the villagers on the slopes of Vesuvius, to 
live with danger; or perhaps the scale of destructiveness in­
volved in a nuclear war has somehow seemed a guarantee 
against its outbreak».
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All in all, the combination of the demographic 
with the technological revolution in transport, com­
munications, and the production of goods of peace 
and weapons of war, which are responsible for the 
unprecedented features of the contemporary multi­
state system—globality, three-dimensional permeabi­
lity of its political units, and destructibility of the 
entire system—have contributed not to the wither­
ing away of states and to the disappearance of the 
multistate system but to the extension of international 
law to the entire globe, to the tremendous increase 
in rules of conventional international law, and to the 
great rise in the number of universal or regional in­
ternational organizations of general or special com­
petence.
In consequence, international law in terms of 
substance consists of the law of peaceful symbiosis 
and cooperation and of the law of international sur­
vival—the latter constituting the precondition of the 
former. This law of survival is politically based not 
on the balance of power on collective security but on 
the balance of terror, which recently has been some­
what qualified. For under the US - Soviet Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the two superpowers 
agreed that it was lawful to set up a network of 
antiballistic missiles around their respective deci­
sion-making centers of Moscow and Washington.
Furthermore, this law begins to include also rules 
concerning threats to the survival of the human race 
that emanate from the combination of the demo­
graphic explosion of mankind with the environ­
mental effects of his peacetime technology. For, un­
less this pollution is combatted and controlled, it 
may eventually lead to results similar to those of an 
uninhibited nuclear war, i.e. to the extinction of the 
human race.
The article by George E. Perry on «The Modern Greek Collection in the Library of Congress» 
in our January-June 1973 issue (pages 14 to 25) was prepared as an official assignment and as part 
of a larger study of library and research resources of East Central and Southeastern Europe jointly 
sponsored by the Library of Congress, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the 
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education (under PL 85-864, 
Title VI, Section 602, as amended, and PL 480). Permission to republish the article must be 
obtained from the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 20540, USA.
Είς τό περιοδικόν μας ύπ’ άριθ. 15-16, Τανουαρίου-Τουνίου 1973, σσ. 14-25, έδημοσιεύθη 
τό αρθρον τοΰ George Ε. Perry, Διευθυντοΰ τοΰ Σλαβικοΰ Τμήματος καί Είδικοϋ είς τά Ελληνικά 
Θέματα (Βιβλιοθήκη τοΰ Κογκρέσσου), «The Modern Greek Collection in the Library of Congress» 
(Ή Συλλογή Νεοελληνικών Βιβλίων είς τήν Βιβλιοθήκην τοϋ Κογκρέσσου). Τοϋτο συνετάγη εις 
τό πλαίσιον τών υπηρεσιακήν καθηκόντων τοΰ συγγραφέως καί αποτελεί μέρος εύρυτέρας μελέ­
της περί των είς τάς βιβλιοθήκας των ΗΠΑ βιβλίων καί των διαθεσίμων είς ΗΠΑ έρευνων περί 
τής ’Ανατολικής Κεντρικής καί Νοτιοανατολικής Εύρώπης. Ή μελέτη έξεπονήθη ύπό τήν αιγίδα 
τής Βιβλιοθήκης τοϋ Κογκρέσσου καί τοΰ Άμερικανικοΰ Συμβουλίου Επιστημονικών Εται­
ρειών, ώς καί τής Διευθύνσεως Παιδείας τοΰ Υπουργείου Υγείας, Παιδείας καί Προνοίας των 
ΗΠΑ (ύπό στοιχεία PL 85-864, Τίτλος VI, Τμήμα 602, ώς τοΰτο έτροποποιήθη, καί PL 480). Διά 
πάσαν άναδημοσίευσιν τοΰ ανωτέρω άρθρου πρέπει να ζητηθή ή άδεια άπό τήν Βιβλιοθήκην τοΰ 
Κογκρέσσου, Washington, D.C. 20540, ΗΠΑ.
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